experts who say Patsy Ramsey wrote the ransom note vs Daubert side of the Forensics

koldkase wrote:
"Me, I can use my own eyes and I don't need no special training to see that Patsy wrote the note.

koldkase wrote:
"Patsy Ramsey wrote the note. Period. No question. No reasonable argument. All anyone who is objective has to do is compare her exemplars with the ransom note, not to mention the repeated, innumerable writings, statements, and interviews with the Ramseys which repeat excessively the language in the ransom note." -

Capricorn wrote:
Patsy wrote that note; there's no denying it. Not only would anyone with a working pair of eyes see it, but the lying about the scale and the rest just prove the point. Yes, Patsy was the one and now inadvertently, AK drove the point home for me

Capricorn wrote:
Again, the naked eye is never obsolete or outdated.

All anyone has to do is look at the comparisons and graphology, shmaphology, the writing is the same, both in handwriting and linguistically. You don't even need an expert to state it; it's blatantly a match

For every expert who is wishy washy or "excludes" Patsy, you'll find another who will state it IS Patsy.

Capricorn wrote:

For every expert who is wishy washy or "excludes" Patsy, you'll find another who will state it IS Patsy.

The Daubert standard provides a rule of evidence regarding the admissibility of expert witnesses' testimony during United States federal legal proceedings. Pursuant to this standard, a party may raise a Daubert motion, which is a special case of motion in limine raised before or during trial to exclude the presentation of unqualified evidence to the jury. The Daubert trilogy refers to the three United States Supreme Court cases that articulated the Daubert standard:

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, which held in 1993 that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not incorporate the Frye "general acceptance" test as a basis for assessing the admissibility of scientific expert testimony, but that the rule incorporated a flexible reliability standard instead;
General Electric Co. v. Joiner,[1] which held that a district court judge may exclude expert testimony when there are gaps between the evidence relied on by an expert and his conclusion, and that an abuse-of-discretion standard of review is the proper standard for appellate courts to use in reviewing a trial court's decision of whether it should admit expert testimony;
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,[2] which held in 1999 that the judge's gatekeeping function identified in Daubert applies to all expert testimony, including that which is non-scientific.


In Daubert, seven members of the Court agreed on the following guidelines for admitting scientific expert testimony:

Judge is gatekeeper: Under Rule 702, the task of "gatekeeping", or assuring that scientific expert testimony truly proceeds from "scientific knowledge", rests on the trial judge.
Relevance and reliability: This requires the trial judge to ensure that the expert's testimony is "relevant to the task at hand" and that it rests "on a reliable foundation". Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584-587. Concerns about expert testimony cannot be simply referred to the jury as a question of weight. Furthermore, the admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 104(a), not Rule 104(b); thus, the Judge must find it more likely than not that the expert's methods are reliable and reliably applied to the facts at hand.
Scientific knowledge = scientific method/methodology: A conclusion will qualify as scientific knowledge if the proponent can demonstrate that it is the product of sound "scientific methodology" derived from the scientific method.[3]
Illustrative Factors: The Court defined "scientific methodology" as the process of formulating hypotheses and then conducting experiments to prove or falsify the hypothesis, and provided a set of illustrative factors (i.e., not a "test") in determining whether these criteria are met:

Whether the theory or technique employed by the expert is generally accepted in the scientific community;
Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication;
Whether it can be and has been tested;
Whether the known or potential rate of error is acceptable; and
Whether the research was conducted independent of the particular litigation or dependent on an intention to provide the proposed testimony.[4]

In 2000, Rule 702 was amended in an attempt to codify and structure elements embodied in the "Daubert trilogy." The rule then read as follows:

Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

(As amended Apr. 17, 2000, eff. Dec. 1, 2000.)

In 2011, Rule 702 was again amended to make the language clearer. The rule now reads:

RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERT WITNESSES
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

(As amended Apr. 17, 2000, eff. Dec. 1, 2000; Apr. 26, 2011, eff. Dec. 1, 2011)

History

Prior to Daubert, relevancy in combination with the Frye test were the dominant standards for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence in Federal courts. Frye is based on a 1923 Federal Court of appeals ruling involving the admissibility of polygraph evidence.[15] Under Frye, the Court-based the admissibility of testimony regarding novel scientific evidence on whether it has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." The trial court's gatekeeper role in this respect is typically described as conservative, thus helping to keep pseudoscience out of the courtroom by deferring to those in the field.

In Daubert, the Supreme Court ruled that the 1923 Frye test was superseded by the 1975 Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically Rule 702 governing expert testimony. Rule 702 originally stated (in its entirety),

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

In Daubert, the Court ruled that nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert evidence "gives any indication that 'general acceptance' is a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence. Moreover, such a rigid standard would be at odds with the Rules' liberal thrust and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony."

By requiring experts to provide relevant opinions grounded in reliable methodology, proponents of Daubert were satisfied that these standards would result in a fair and rational resolution of the scientific and technological issues which lie at the heart of product liability adjudication.[16]

Ironically, Daubert has not appeared to further the Federal Rules philosophy of admitting generally all relevant testimony, and specifically of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony." The Daubert decision has instead been heralded by some political commentators as one of the most important Supreme Court decisions in imposing higher barriers for toxic tort and product liability cases, by allegedly reducing the volume of so-called junk science in the court room.

According to a 2002 RAND study, post Daubert, the percentage of expert testimony by scientists that was excluded from the courtroom significantly rose. This rise likely contributed to a doubling in successful motions for summary judgment in which 90% were against plaintiffs.[17] Beyond this study, there is little empirical evidence of the impact of Daubert. However, some critics argue that Daubert has disrupted the balance between plaintiffs and defendants, “The exclusion of expert testimony affects plaintiffs far more than defendants because plaintiffs may then not be able to meet their required burden of proof. Furthermore, there is little point in plaintiffs going to the expense of Daubert motions to exclude defendant’s experts until they know if their case will proceed. So if more experts are now being excluded, then Daubert has undoubtedly shifted the balance between plaintiffs and defendants and made it more difficult for plaintiffs to litigate successfully.”[8] Similarly, Daubert hearings can be subject to various abuses by attorneys attempting to bolster a weak case. These tactics can range from simply attempting to delay the case to driving up the costs of the litigation forcing settlement.[18]

A different pattern has emerged in criminal cases. In criminal cases, the prosecution has the burden of proof and uses a host of forensic science methods as evidence to prove their case. But, Daubert motions are rarely made by criminal defendants and when they do, they lose a majority of the challenges.[19][20] Some critics of the use of unreliable science in court argue that Daubert has had beneficial effects in civil litigation, but fails to address the underlying pathologies of the forensic science system that leads to dubious verdicts in criminal cases.[21]

Some commentators believe that Daubert caused judges to become—in the phrase used in former Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s dissent in Daubert—amateur scientists, many lacking the scientific literacy to effectively fulfill their role as gatekeeper of scientific evidence.[22] Although "science for judges" forums have emerged in the wake of Daubert in order to educate judges in a variety of scientific fields, many are still skeptical about the usefulness of the Daubert standard in discerning valid science.[23][24][25] The responsibility to assess scientific relevance has shifted from highly trained expert witnesses to judges deficient in science education. The "Daubert" ruling furthermore admits the possible introduction of non-peer reviewed data and conclusions. This increasingly shifts the burden of scientific judgement onto judges who have not had an education which would enable them to properly evaluate such data.[26]

Pursuant to Rule 104(a), in Daubert the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the following factors be considered:[27]

Has the technique been tested in actual field conditions (and not just in a laboratory)?
Has the technique been subject to peer review and publication?
What is the known or potential rate of error?
Do standards exist for the control of the technique's operation?
Has the technique been generally accepted within the relevant scientific community?

The Supreme Court explicitly cautioned that the Daubert list should not be regarded by judges as "a definitive checklist or test..." Yet in practice, judges have judged the admissibility of scientific evidence using the "Daubert factors" as a checklist; for example, the trial court judge in Kumho admitted to erroneously treating the factors as mandatory.[8]
International influence

The Canadian Supreme Court has expressly adopted the Daubert standard in two cases. R. v. Mohan,;[28] R. v. J.L.-J., [2000].[29] In J.L.-J., the Court took a look at the development of U.S. law in this regard, noted the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of the Frye standard and its replacement with the Daubert Standard. While the Court did note that: " Daubert must be read in light of the specific text of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which differs from our own procedures," the Court also stated in the same sentence that "the U.S. Supreme Court did list a number of factors that could be helpful in evaluating the soundness of novel science."[30] The Court then applied the Daubert standard to a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal. The Quebec Court had held that greater liberality should be applied by the Court in receiving pro-defense scientific evidence in a criminal case.[31] The Court rejected this decision and reinstated the defendant's conviction.

Additionally, in 2005, the United Kingdom House of Commons Science and Technology Committee recommended the creation of a Forensic Science Advisory Council to regulate forensic evidence in the UK and observed that:

The absence of an agreed protocol for the validation of scientific techniques prior to their being admitted in court is entirely unsatisfactory. Judges are not well-placed to determine scientific validity without input from scientists. We recommend that one of the first tasks of the Forensic Science Advisory Council be to develop a "gate-keeping" test for expert evidence. This should be done in partnership with judges, scientists and other key players in the criminal justice system, and should build on the US Daubert test.[32]

The Law Commission for England and Wales has proposed a consultation paper (No.190) to adopt a criterion like the Daubert Standard to help reform the law of evidence in regards to the admissibility of scientific evidence.[33]

Scientific knowledge = scientific method/methodology: A conclusion will qualify as scientific knowledge if the proponent can demonstrate that it is the product of sound "scientific methodology"/derived from the scientific method.[4]
Factors relevant: The Court defined "scientific methodology" as the process of formulating hypotheses and then conducting experiments to prove or falsify the hypothesis, and provided a nondispositive, nonexclusive, "flexible" test for establishing its "validity":

Empirical testing: the theory or technique must be falsifiable, refutable, and testable.
Subjected to peer review and publication.
Known or potential error rate.
The existence and maintenance of standards and controls concerning its operation.
Degree to which the theory and technique is generally accepted by a relevant scientific community.